Australia joining the B-21 Raider program was considered, by some, to be the right strategic move—but ultimately policy makers walked away from the long-range bomber option. Was that the right decision? In this video, we break down the strategic, financial, and operational arguments behind Australia’s decision not to pursue the B-21, and what it means for the future of long-range strike in the Indo-Pacific.
Over the past five years, the Australian Defence Force has been contemplating joining the B-21 program. After the public reveal of the Raider, our interest in the project garnered international attention. While many politicians and critics opposed such an expensive purchase, others—ranging from military analysts to RAAF personnel writing for outlets like The Runway—highlighted how beneficial such a platform could be.
The Australian 2024 National Defence Strategy outlines six key priorities: nuclear-powered submarines, long-range missiles, upgraded northern bases, better-trained soldiers, increased technological innovation, and stronger Indo-Pacific ties. The strategy also stresses integration across the Army, Navy, Air Force, Space, and cyber domains. Although the Defence Strategic Review rejected the Raider in 2023 in favour of these priorities, debates persist about the most effective way to project air power in our region.
The 2026 National Defence Strategy continues to sharpen a strategy of denial, with greater emphasis on self-reliance, autonomous systems, and extending the range at which Australia can hold adversaries at risk. In the past, this role was famously carried out by the F-111. Currently, a mix of naval and air capabilities tries to achieve that mission, but some analysts suggest that the B-21 could directly replace the long-range strike role the F-111 once provided. However, the current defence strategy does not address the B-21 at all. Extending the range of deterrence lies in stand-off strike systems, uncrewed systems, and existing aircraft, rather than fielding sovereign deep-strike bombers.
Nevertheless, outside government policy, the B-21 is still actively discussed. Australia’s unique geopolitical and geographic position means a platform like the B-21 could demonstrate a credible ability to hold potential adversaries at risk, and at considerable distance. This is still a topic worth discussing in terms of projecting air power for small nations like Australia.
BACKGROUND TO FAILED DEAL
Between 2019 and 2021, think tanks like ASPI published several articles analysing the potential integration of Northrop Grumman’s Raider into the Australian Defence Force.
The possibility of Australia acquiring the B-21 entered public debate in 2022 when Defence Minister Richard Marles said the concept had been examined. Around the same time, US Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall stated that if Australia formally approached the United States, the possibility of a sale could be reviewed, although no export policy existed at that point. Following the aircraft’s public reveal in December 2022, the prospect of Australia joining the program became a significant defence news story.
After extensive debate, the 2023 Defence Strategic Review rejected the B-21 option. Instead, the government prioritised strengthening northern bases, developing integrated missile capabilities, and acquiring new long-range weapons for existing aircraft.
For power projection and area denial, priority shifted toward the AUKUS submarine program.
Budget considerations likely influenced the decision. Each aircraft is expected to cost hundreds of millions of dollars, making even a modest fleet a substantial investment.
With that decision, Australia effectively moved on from the Raider program. But the question remains: how could such an aircraft have enhanced the RAAF, and would the expense have been justified?
CURRENT RAAF CAPABILITIES
To understand the debate, it is worth looking into the capabilities of the RAAF as it currently stands.
Although working with a relatively modest budget compared to larger powers, the RAAF has adopted a procurement strategy focused on highly capable multirole platforms integrated into a single force structure.
Australia remains the only country besides the United States to operate the EA-18G Growler, giving the RAAF a dedicated electronic warfare capability seldom seen outside the major powers.
Australia has also led the way in collaborative combat aircraft. The BoeingThe Boeing Company: A global aerospace leader and one of the world’s largest defense contractors, specializing in the design and manufacture of milita... More MQ-28A Ghost Bat program has already demonstrated air-to-air missile capability and is progressing through further development stages, offering a potential source of affordable combat mass that can operate alongside crewed aircraft under the command of E-7A Wedgetails.
The F-35 and E-7A represent some of the most advanced capabilities in the RAAF inventory. The F-35 provides stealth multirole combat ability, while the Wedgetail remains one of the world’s leading airborne early warning and battle management platforms.
The Super Hornet fleet continues to offer a versatile strike and air combat platform capable of conducting air-to-air, strike, SEADSEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses): A military operation designed to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade enemy air defense systems to al... More, and maritime operations.
Other key assets include the P-8 Poseidon and MQ-4C Triton, which provide long-range maritime surveillance across Australia’s vast approaches.
This force structure emphasises flexibility. Aircraft such as the F-35, Super Hornet, and Ghost Bat can undertake various roles within an integrated system supported by tankers, surveillance aircraft, and electronic warfare platforms.
This approach reflects Australia’s defence budget realities. In many cases, multirole platforms offer more value than specialised aircraft. However, there are exceptions. The Growler fills a niche electronic warfare role that other aircraft cannot match. There might also be another gap in the force structure—one that was previously filled by the F-111.
NEED FOR LONG RANGE STEALTH STRIKE CAPABILITIES
Since its launch in the 1960s, the F-111 played a distinctive role in Australian defence strategy. It combined high speed, long range, and a large payload capacity in a relatively compact strike aircraft.
Entering Australian service in 1973, it became one of the most iconic aircraft ever operated by the RAAF. By the time of its retirement in 2010, it was clearly ageing, but it had provided decades of long-range strike capability that no later platform fully replaced.
Although the aircraft lacked stealth, it had impressive performance for its time. With a theoretical maximum speed around Mach 2.2-2.5 and a stores capacity of about 31,500 pounds, it could carry large payloads over significant distances. Its combat radius of approximately 1,160 nautical miles enabled strikes well beyond Australia’s immediate region.
Australia’s geography underscores the importance of this type of range. The country’s northern approaches span great distances, and many potential operating zones are thousands of kilometres from main southern bases. While northern facilities are being upgraded, they remain fairly exposed to long-range missile attacks. Aircraft that can launch from bases further south and still reach contested areas offer valuable strategic depth.
Today, the strategic environment has evolved. Advanced air defence systems make stealth increasingly essential for penetrating defended airspace. However, the geographic reality remains unchanged: large distances still need to be crossed before any strike mission can commence.
In this sense, the F-111 never truly had a modern replacement option for its specific long-range strike role.
To block hostile forces approaching Australia’s northern approaches, three main options are available. The first involves long-range surface-launched missiles that can strike at sea-based threats. The second relies on power projection from naval assets, which have traditionally included aircraft carriers and, in the future, submarines. The third involves direct strikes from air platforms.
Long-range missiles will certainly be a key part of Australia’s future strategy, but they also raise concerns about magazine capacity. Missiles are single-use weapons, while aircraft are reusable platforms that can launch multiple weapons in repeated sorties. A stealth bomber carrying many stand-off weapons could thus maintain strike operations in a way that solely missile-based deterrence cannot.
Australia’s future strategy will likely depend heavily on submarines as part of a layered denial approach. From a military perspective, this may be effective, but from a geopolitical view, the visible presence of a stealth bomber carries a powerful signalling effect. Aircraft like the B-2 have long symbolised American global strike ability, and the B-21 will probably take on that role.
Today, projecting air power deep into Australia’s northern approaches would require tanker support to extend the range of aircraft like the F-35. However, tankers are large, slow, and highly visible targets. In a high-end conflict, they would likely be pushed well away from contested airspace, greatly reducing the fighter combat radius. A long-range stealth bomber such as the B-21 changes this by allowing deep strike missions without the need for persistent tanker support near contested areas.
CONCLUSION
In the coming decades, Australia might encounter growing strategic pressure in the Indo-Pacific.
History has consistently shown that control of Australia holds great strategic importance in the Pacific. Today, the region once again finds itself between two major global powers, boosting the strategic significance of the continent.
Australia’s critical minerals and natural resources further enhance its significance to both allies and rivals. Whether through diplomatic pressure, economic rivalry, or military coercion, the ability to influence Australia will remain strategically important.
How should Australia respond? One answer is to leverage its strengths: maintaining strong alliances, protecting critical industries, and prioritising the denial of hostile forces approaching its shores.
During the Cold War, this denial strategy relied partly on the F-111 and Australia’s carrier capabilities. These platforms served not only as operational tools but also as strong political signals of national strength.
There is also an alliance aspect worth considering. If the B-21 becomes the core of American long-range strike power in the Indo-Pacific, allied forces capable of operating compatible platforms could play a larger role in coalition efforts. Even a small Australian fleet could complicate an adversary’s planning and spread strike capability across multiple allied bases.
A final consideration relates to extended deterrence. Although Australia does not have nuclear weapons, the credibility of allied deterrence partly relies on the ability of partners to host, support, and integrate advanced strike capabilities. Long-range stealth bombers have historically played a vital role in this framework by offering survivable and adaptable strike platforms that demonstrate deep strategic cooperation between allies.
The F-111 once represented Australia’s long-range strike capability. Today, in the United States, that role is more closely linked to stealth aircraft like the B-2 and its successor, the B-21.
The B-21 may be the closest modern equivalent to the role once filled by the F-111. It would require a significant investment, but its extremely low radar cross-section and long range could offer capabilities difficult for potential adversaries to counter. Ultimately, this remains a thought experiment. Would such an aircraft strengthen Australia’s strategic position, or are current capabilities enough? The debate goes on, let us know what you think in the comments.
