Operation Orchard executed Israel’s September 2007 precision airstrike on Syria’s al-KibarA remote site in the Deir ez-Zor region of eastern Syria where Syria was allegedly constructing a covert nuclear reactor with North Korean assistance.... More nuclear reactor, suspected of North Korean plutonium production. Mossad intelligence and commando recon confirmed the site; IAF F-15Is/F-16Is delivered laser-guided bombs and Mavericks under electronic jamming, flying covert Mediterranean routes to destroy the facility undetected without losses.
Today, it seems the Middle East is on the brink of another regional conflict, and it is possible that western militaries may be forced to intervene in some way. Given the relevance to us all, in the near future we will take a look at a number of middle eastern air operations, from Australian forces fighting ISIS in Operation Okra, to Iranian sneak attacks on Iraqi bases in the 1980s. Today, we take a look at Operation Orchard, one of only two claimed raids on a nuclear facility.
PRETEXT
In 2001, it was reported that communications between North Korea and Syria were increasing. The situation was being monitored by a number of Israeli and US intelligence services. The Israeli Military intelligence department – Aman – suggested that behind closed doors Syrian president Bashar Al Assad was discussing potential nuclear arms trade. However, Mossad disagreed with this assessment, but neither could confirm or deny what exactly was going on.
In 2004, US intelligence also intercepted communications between Syria and North Korea, tracing these calls to a facility in the desert known as al-KibarA remote site in the Deir ez-Zor region of eastern Syria where Syria was allegedly constructing a covert nuclear reactor with North Korean assistance.... More. This intelligence reached the Israelis, who took note of the location, handing over signals intelligence to the well known Unit 8200 for monitoring.
Investigations into this location were prioritised. In 2006 it was reported that a high ranking Syrian nuclear expert travelled under a false name to London – he was identified as the head of the Syrian atomic energy commission, Ibrahim Ottman.
Mossad had sent three teams to investigate. One trailed him as he went shopping, while another broke into his apartment when he was out. A computer expert on the team found his laptop, installed monitoring software, and took data to analyse.
Upon returning, the team found that the laptop contained hundreds of photos of the al-Kabir facility at different stages of production, including photos of Ibrahim Ottman with North Korean nuclear specialist Chon Chibu. Mossad had planned to assassinate Ottman there, but decided to spare his life.
Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert was alerted to the situation, and the CIA was notified. Before long, US intelligence was monitoring the situation and a panel was set up to share information. It was now being claimed by Brigadier General Yaakov Amidror that this was indeed a nuclear facility under production, aided by North Korea.
In August 2007, a mission was planned to confirm the nature of the site. A recon team from Sayeret Matkal – one of Israel’s most elite special forces units – was tasked for the job. Two helicopters covertly ferried twelve soldiers into al-Kabir and the immediate area of the facility. Dressed in Syrian uniforms, they made their way to the facility and began collecting soil samples and taking photographs. As they got closer to the facility, they were spotted by Syrian forces, and forced to pull back, and were extracted from the location.
The mission is still a success, with photos and samples of the site. The Israelis review what they find and claim that the samples and photos confirm al-Kabir is a nuclear facility. Conversations between the US and Israel become tense; President George Bush is asked whether he will approve a US strike on the base, but the US is not convinced that this is indeed a nuclear site. Israel then says it will strike the base itself. The CIA fear this may start a regional war, while Mossad counters that if it is covert, they can convince Syria to accept the outcome of the strike without any public announcement.
The controversial decision is made to go forward with a strike – Israel will be alone on this mission. Interestingly, it was claimed that US intelligence didn’t pick up any unusual behaviour in regards to this site, because the Syrians ditched digital communications, and used runners to deliver printed messages between high ranking officers.
There were two options on the table; the first was to send in a second team of special forces. They could place explosives on the facility and retreat. But this presents several problems; there was a high chance the team might be captured, a higher chance they’ll be detected beforehand, and once the explosions go off, the base will be on alert, making it difficult to extract the team. But the biggest problem is that the building would likely need more explosives than the team could carry and placement that would prove extremely difficult.
The more viable option was an airstrike. It would be a fast, surprise attack, delivering the required payload, and have virtually no risk of capture.
PREPARATIONS
This daring raid would require pilots with a high level of patience, precision, and calmness. The qualities the planners were looking for to secure a high chance of success are rare even among experienced pilots, however there was one squadron up for the task. The IAF’s 69th Squadron – known as the Hammers69 Squadron (Hammers): An Israeli Air Force squadron established in July 1948 during the War of Independence to operate three B-17 Flying Fortresses a... More – had the support of Air Force leadership, and the task of striking this alleged nuclear reactor is tasked to them.
Confidence in the squadron’s success is high, as the Israeli Air Force has done this sort of mission before. Flying in close formation to mimic an airliner, four F-16s entered Iraqi airspace in 1981, struck a nuclear reactor under construction, and escaped. This was the only recorded strike on a nuclear facility in history, and the Israelis had confidence they could replicate this success.
In some ways this mission would be easier – the Syrians did not possess the strength the Iraqis did in the 1980s – but in other ways it will be harder. The target was far in the north. Attempting to fly there directly through Syria would almost certainly result in detection, and given the distance, Syrian aircraft would easily guess where the Israelis were heading, and move to safeguard the site.
OPERATION BEGINS
On September 3rd, 2007, Israeli intelligence tracks a North Korean cargo ship entering port in Syria. It was thought that this ship was carrying nuclear fuel rods. The decision is then made to go ahead with the airstrike. It would take place on September 6.
A number of aircraft will take part – several electronic intelligenceELINT (Electronic Intelligence) – A subcategory of signals intelligence (SIGINT) involving the collection, analysis, and exploitation of non-communica... More aircraft to jam Syrian radar imagery, four F-15Is from 69-Squadron, and a group of over four F-16Is from 119 and 253 Squadron. The F-15s would use laser guided bombs, whilst the F-16s would use 500-pound bombs and AGM-65 Mavericks. The decision is supposedly made to also send in a small group of commandos near the base, who will laze the targets for the jets before they arrive, before being extracted.
As night sets in on September the 5th, 2007, the IAF aircraft take off and form up for the strike scheduled to take place just after midnight. The F-16s from Ramon Air Base will form up with the F-15s from Hatzerim.
From there, they will head west into the Mediterranean. There are two paths they could have taken. They could have flown north along the coast of Lebanon, then crossed into Syrian airspace at an altitude of one-hundred or so feet. Flying directly across the desert, strike the base, then head north into Turkish airspace, reach the sea, then head south, returning to base.
The more likely path would be west, behind Cyprus – a longer route – then approach from the north-west into Turkey, likely a far less suspicious rout then flying along the Lebanese coast. They would then turn into Syria from the north, avoiding areas with heavy SAMSurface-to-Air Missile: A ground-based or ship-launched guided missile system designed to detect, track, and destroy enemy aircraft, helicopters, crui... More coverage on the coast, strike the base, then follow the same path back through Turkey to the coast, and then head home.
The most important element here will be stealth. Neither the F-15 nor F-16 have stealth capability and the Syrians have advanced anti-aircraft hardware at their disposal. This is where advanced electronic warfare will play an important part of the mission. As the strike group are over the Mediterranean, the electronic intelligenceELINT (Electronic Intelligence) – A subcategory of signals intelligence (SIGINT) involving the collection, analysis, and exploitation of non-communica... More aircraft manage to hide the incoming aircraft from Syrian radars.
How they did this is still unclear. The most common explanation is that Gulfstream G550’s, equipped with an advanced electronic warfare suite, escorted the aircraft. The F-15s may have also had electronic warfare capabilities. It has also been claimed that the entire Syrian air defence system was hacked to ignore the enemy aircraft, using a BAE SystemsA British multinational defense, security, and aerospace company headquartered in London and one of the world's largest defense contractors. Formed in... More program known as Suter 3. It is claimed this software allows the operator to see what enemy radars see, and manipulate the system, alter images, and even invade links between missile systems and radar sites, all without detection. A third theory is that the Syrians were simply told to stand down when they saw the Israelis were heading for the reactor.
The flight reaches their turning point over the ocean, they head east, passing over the coast into Turkish airspace. Continuing east, commandos are now on the ground some distance from Al-Kabir, preparing the laser for the strike.
The strike aircraft continue eastwards, before diverting south towards the target. As they close in, they ready weapons, lowering their altitude. Rapidly approaching the coordinates, the aircraft begin locking up the lazed target. The F-16s fire off their Mavericks at the site, followed by the release of their 500-pound bombs. Then the F-15s move in behind, releasing their assortment of laser guided bombs.
The Mavericks strike the target, destroying parts of the infrastructure, followed shortly after by the other bombs lighting up the facility. During the chaos, the commandos extract via a low flying helicopter.
The base is now on high alert, although it is difficult to know exactly how effective the strike has been. The strike group turn around and begin heading northeast towards Turkey. They will now need to escape the Syrian Air Force, who send aircraft up to search for the bandits.
It is unlikely that these older aircraft, with more archaic radars, will suffer the same digital attacks as the ground radars, so it is possible that these Syrian aircraft searching for the strike group may be able to lock them up.
Speeding up, the group successfully navigate into Turkish air space over Gaziantep, where they jettison their external tanks and head westwards towards the sea. All aircraft make it out, escaping into the Mediterranean, where they begin the journey south, towards home.
ULTIMATUM TO ASSAD
After returning, satellite imagery confirms the results of the operation; it is a successful raid, with the facility in disarray. But it’s not over yet, some final negotiations are in play.
Both Israel and Syria, ironically, have a mutual interest in keeping things quiet – or at least that’s what Israel believes. To the Israelis, they have struck a potential nuclear reactor in a country they are technically not at war with. To Syria, they are – if the information was correct – engaged in building a nuclear facility in breach of international constraints. Both sides will suffer consequences if this information goes mainstream.
Both countries are on high alert; Syria supposedly puts long range missiles armed with chemical warheads on high alert, which will act as their equivalent to nuclear weapons which they believe Israel has pointed at them. This standoff is not publicised, but Turkish media is now reporting that people are finding Israeli fuel tanks in Gaziantep.
Israel sends a message to the Syrian government; they will not publicise what has happened – which would be a humiliating blow – so long as Syria also keeps quiet. It appears to work, and in the days that follow, the Syrians address reports of an attack by obfuscating, saying that Israeli aircraft were detected, but were scared off. A year later, when publicly questioned, Al Assad says there was no such site.
For the next decade, the reports will be mere speculation about the true nature of what happened. It would not be until years later that confirmation and details of the attack were released, letting the world know that there was indeed an aerial raid into Syria to strike what was purported to be a nuclear plant.
