How Good is Iran’s Air Power?

What another war in the region will look like remains unclear. Either another series of airstrikes with retaliatory missile barrages from Iran, or a full-scale regime change, as we’ve seen before. Either way, all eyes are once again on Iran and Israel.

A year ago, in the lead-up to the 12-day war, we reviewed Iran’s long-range missile arsenal. Today, these missile systems are once again the focal point of this dormant conflict. While the Israeli Air Force has near-total air dominance in the region, Iran’s geopolitical bargaining chip is its drone and surface-launched missile capabilities.

HISTORY

To understand Iran’s unique air power situation, we need to review the events that led here.

As many know, Iran was reintroduced into the Western sphere of influence in the 1950s, though this process was marked by instability. During World War II, Iran clashed with England, which held rights to most of its oil resources. Subsequently, England and Russia demanded the expulsion of Germans residing in Iran. The Iranian government refused, leading to Operation Countenance—a combined Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran.

By the start of the Cold War, Iran had attempted to pivot away from British influence while keeping its distance from the Soviets. Prime Minister Mossadegh would take power in 1951, nationalising British oil infrastructure.

Embargoes and trade restrictions were placed on Iran, leading to economic unrest. During this period, the US feared communist factions might seize control. MI6 approached the US for help in orchestrating a coup, but the US declined cooperation throughout 1952, aligning instead with Mossadegh.

Then in 1953, the US agreed to a coup under Operation Ajax. MI6 aimed to regain control of oil resources, while the CIA’s wider objective was to contain Soviet influence and secure the region. Noting MI6’s limited capabilities, the CIA took the lead in rebuilding intelligence efforts in the area and had almost complete control over the operation. The result was the installation of the Shah.

Over the following twenty-five years, Iran would be fundamentally aligned with the West. This would translate directly into weapons sales, which were similar in scale to those acquired by Israel during the period.

Both the Shah and his son were aviators, and special emphasis was placed on the country’s air assets. In 1968, the Imperial Iranian Air Force would procure 225 F-4 Phantoms alongside a fleet of C-130s. This was followed in 1971 by the acquisition of Chinooks, with Iran’s Army Aviation eventually fielding 90, with a further 5 in air force use.

Then, in 1974, a major purchase would be made to further strengthen the air force. 181 F-5E Tigers would be acquired, supplemented by several BoeingThe Boeing Company: A global aerospace leader and one of the world’s largest defense contractors, specializing in the design and manufacture of milita... More 707s and 747s for transport and aerial refuelling. For maritime defence, several P-3 Orions would be purchased. Finally, to bring the Air Force to fourth-gen standards, the Shah personally oversaw fly-offs between the new F-15 and the F-14. The decision was made to purchase the Tomcat, with 80 ordered—its most iconic purchase.

REVOLUTION ERA

Then everything would change. In 1979, the Islamic Revolution would bring a complete change in government and the military. Many pilots were jailed. However, within months, they would be offered a return to service as conflict broke out with Iraq. The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force – as it was then called – would continue operating American aircraft.

Due to US trade restrictions, Iranians depended on intricate black market networks to obtain dependable parts for their fleet. When the US discovered this, new restrictions were introduced, prohibiting civilians from freely purchasing aircraft components at auctions. Additionally, when a Tomcat was retired, the entire aircraft was destroyed to prevent parts from entering the black market.

This would mark a crucial moment that still impacts Iran’s air power today. Most of the American-built aircraft were put under heavy strain during the Iran-Iraq War, which lasted throughout the 1980s. Under constant use, including intercepting supersonic bombers and conducting extreme low-level bombing raids, by the 1990s it was believed that, due to this combination of part shortages and heavy use, Iran’s fighter fleet was heavily fatigued.

Since then, Iran has reportedly created workarounds by domestically developing its own components to keep the aircraft operational.

However, the primary focus has now shifted mostly to small, cost-effective drones and larger, long-range surface-launched missiles.

MODERN AIR FORCE STRENGTH

This brings us to the current situation of the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF). Due to ageing and extensive Israeli strikes in 2025, Iran’s air force has been significantly diminished. It still operates a large fleet of ageing, primarily American and Soviet-era aircraft and remains shaped by decades of sanctions, leading to a strong emphasis on domestic maintenance, reverse engineering, and the development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ballistic missiles to compensate for its conventional air power limitations.

As of early 2026, the IRIAF’s active inventory consists of approximately 400 aircraft. The fighter fleet, which forms the backbone of its air combat capability, is a diverse mix of platforms with varying degrees of operational readiness. According to the World Directory of Modern Military Aircraft 2024, the most numerous aircraft being 63 F-4D/E/RF Phantom IIs, 41 F-14A/AM Tomcats, 35 F-5E Tiger IIs, 23 Su-24MKs, 18 MiG-29As, and a range of other fighters and support aircraft. Despite upgrades, these aircraft are technologically outmatched by regional rivals. The operational status of its aging aircraft, like the F-14 and F-4, is a testament to the ingenuity of Iranian engineers but also highlights the service’s struggle to maintain a modern fighting force.

Realistically, Iran’s best chance to deploy a competitive fighter aircraft is the Su-35SE. Recent reporting from late 2025 and early 2026, including leaked Russian defense documents, confirms that a deal for 24 Su-35 jets is active, and production is underway. An April 2025 War Zone report states that some of these aircraft were shipped to Algeria. Iran has begun receiving Russian-made Yak-130 advanced trainer jets. The delivery of these aircraft is a crucial step in modernising its air force and preparing pilots for next-generation fighters like the Su-35. But given an impending war, it is unlikely that Iran will have a sufficiently large fleet of Su-35s ready for conflict anytime soon.

AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS

Before discussing surface-launched missile systems, we should first review the available air defence systems.

Iran maintains two advanced air defense systems: the S-300 and its domestically developed equivalent, the self-propelled Bavar 373. They also tout an upgraded version of Bavar 373 as a rival to the S-400. Although untested, it reportedly has a detection range of 250 to 300 kilometres and is claimed to intercept aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.

Long-range platforms include the Khordad 3 and Khordad 15, both self-propelled, with claimed detection ranges of 70 to 150 kilometres. A third, the Talash, is similar, domestically built, and integrates missiles from the S-200.

For medium-range defense, several mostly domestic systems are available. The main ones are the Raad, believed to be modeled after the SA-17, with a range of up to 50 kilometers, and the Mersad, based on the MIM-23 Hawk, which can reach up to 75 kilometers.

Finally, for point defence, Iran fields – among others – the Herz-9, based on China’s HQ-7; the portable Misagh-2, based on the Igla; and several other lesser-known systems.

As a whole, Iran has attempted to build a modern, multilayered, integrated air defence network, almost entirely with domestically produced systems– not a bad achievement. How these systems fare in combat and how many are actually fielded is unknown.

We can assume that, based on their ballistic missile program we will examine next, Iran can produce advanced rocket propulsion and guidance systems. However, it is still uncertain if they have the same level of expertise in developing search and track radar systems.

MISSILE STRENGTH

This brings us to Iran’s primary strength – missile technology. Iran fields a vast array of domestically produced ballistic missiles.

Several medium-range ballistic missiles are fielded, both solid- and liquid-fuelled. They include, among others, the Sejjil and Khorramshahr-4, solid- and liquid-fuelled, respectively, with a claimed range of 2000 kilometres.

The Ghadr and Emad, both liquid-fuelled, have a claimed range of between 2000 and 3000 kilometres.

Shorter-range systems include the solid-fuelled Fateh missiles, with claimed ranges of 300 to 750 kilometres, and the Shahab 1, liquid-fuelled with a range of 350 kilometres.

Various other missiles are produced domestically, including two land-attack cruise missiles, the Hoveizeh and the Paveh, with claimed ranges between 1350 and 1650 kilometres.

Most of these have a payload of between 450 and 750 kilograms (990 to 1600 pounds), with some exceptions. The Khorramshahr is claimed to have a 1500-kilogram (3300-pound) payload, although its employment status is uncertain.

Iran has publicly claimed to possess hypersonic missiles, unveiling the Fattah-1 (a manoeuvring ballistic missile) and Fattah-2 (a claimed hypersonic glide vehicle). While these announcements signal Tehran’s clear ambition to develop highly advanced, high-speed, and manoeuvrable weapons, Western defence experts are sceptical. They largely assess the Fattah-1 as an advanced ballistic missile with a manoeuvring warhead rather than a true hypersonic weapon, and note the lack of evidence for the operational status of the Fattah-2.

Overall, as we noted in our analysis of Iran’s missile program over a year ago, this provides extensive coverage across the region. Importantly, it includes key areas such as Israel, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and U.S. military bases in Iraq and Syria. Aligning with their military strategy, this enables Iran to hedge against regional rivals by threatening direct retaliation.

As seen a year ago – and with no indication of fundamental new tech breakthroughs – it appears that the primary tactic that would be employed is saturation. Whether at bases or to overwhelm the Iron Dome.

DRONE CAPABILITES

The next major focus is drone technology.

Having been an early adopter of unmanned direct-attack systems before the Ukraine War broke out, Iran’s drones have ironically become an international focal point.

By far the most notable is the Shahed family of drones, namely the 136 and 129. Propeller-driven and easy to mass-produce, these have seemingly been replicated by Russia and Ukraine, and reportedly served as inspiration for the new LUCAS platform. The Shahed, alongside the Arash, offer ranges possibly up to 2000 kilometres.

Beyond this, a variety of reusable drones are produced. The small, short-range Ababil-3 and Mohajer-6, used by proxy forces for both reconnaissance and precision munition deployment, can fly between 100 and 200 kilometres. Larger drones such as the Kaman-22 and Karrar can fly in excess of 1000 kilometres, offering both ISR and strike capabilities. Their largest drone, the Fotros, is an ISR platform focused on maritime patrol.

In much the same manner as their approach to missile employment, we predict that Iran’s strategy for drone warfare will be to swarm hostile positions and use non-state actors to launch threats from unpredictable locations.

The primary benefits of these drones are ease of use, production capacity, and cost. In this way, they have produced a variety of recon, strike, and loitering munition systems—some conventional, others small enough for deployment in the field by militias.

Overall, Iran’s domestic drone systems seem capable of their intended tasking, especially for kamikaze-like attacks. What’s more, unlike missiles, these drones’ relative simplicity means production processes can be replicated and rebuilt far more easily in the event of war.

PREDICTIONS AND ANALYSIS

Given all this, how does Iran’s overall military strength measure up, and how would it perform in another conflict with Israel or the US? Based on the initial exchanges between Iran and Israel a year ago, as well as the so-called 12-Day War, we can form a reasonable understanding.

Based on the information available, Iran is locked in a purely defensive posture. Long-range missiles and drones can strike at long distances; these are fundamentally defensive – not offensive – in nature.

Without soldiers on the ground, kinetic conflict in the region rests almost entirely on a balance between intercepting incoming aerial threats and breaching the other side’s defensive systems. During the missile barrages before the 12 Day War, a combination of drone swarms and saturation attacks from Iran using surface-launched missiles indeed overwhelmed both the David’s Sling and Iron Dome systems. Other friendly assets – like American aircrews – based along the trajectory were also unable to neutralise all threats.

We assume Iran will continue to exploit this vulnerability in future kinetic conflicts by emphasising increased launch capabilities. Israel has observed and attempted to address this vulnerability. Beyond targeting runways, oil depots, or hangars, the real tactical threat from Iranian missile barrages is likely to wear down an opponent.

And this brings the conversation back to the primary point of disparity. Without a large-scale intelligence network in its rivals’ territory, nor a force capable of rapid forward deployment into hostile territory, Iran is fundamentally locked in a defence-only posture.

Most of Iran’s military initiatives are focused on geopolitical strategies, primarily aiming to deter direct attacks through the threat of retaliation. Yet, if a vulnerability is identified in this strategy—or if a nation like Israel is prepared to accept the consequences of retaliatory strikes—then this defensive stance becomes less effective. In that scenario, Iran would need to adopt an inward-focused approach, predominantly depending on militia warfare to deny access to the area.

This brings us to Iran’s position during a full-scale war. As shown, once the 12-Day War actually kicked off, no major aerial threat was encountered by the Israelis—supposedly due to electronic warfare systems that kept even older platforms like the F-16 secure over Iran. The US—seemingly relying on stealth—managed to break through saturated air defences without any major problems. Few Iranian aircraft were supposedly shot down, despite reports of launches throughout the two-week war; this coincides with mixed reports of Iranian aircraft returning to base without any contact.

In the event of a larger-scale kinetic war, we can infer several points. First, Iran’s air force would probably see minimal action due to the significant electronic warfare technology gap between Israel and Iran, which largely neutralizes direct intercept threats—similar to last year’s events. If the US were to intervene, the typical result would be the grounding of Iranian fighters. This outcome is common whenever a substantial technology disparity exists between two air forces. Essentially, if the chances of a successful engagement are very low, launching attacks either makes no tactical difference or results in a net loss of personnel and assets. That’s why most smaller air forces tend to withdraw once American aircraft are involved.

Beyond this, it remains unclear how consequential Iran’s military capabilities could be. While largely outside the realm of air power, we presume that if a war between the US and Iran broke out with the goal of regime change, reliance on modern technology would deteriorate within the first week or so. Without a guaranteed ability to deny overflight of stealth aircraft, US strikes would be able to neutralise missile launch positions and production facilities, while a combination of special forces, field agents, and kinetic strikes would be used to knock out key personnel in military and government leadership positions.

The presence of US naval assets in the region—visible in today’s buildup—suggests that ship-launched weaponry would also play a role, similar to what occurred in Venezuela, the Iraq war, and Desert Storm.

Such a situation could lead to a protracted conflict, with loyalists resorting to unconventional warfare—the most reliable way to fight a superior adversary—while factional warfare breaks out as power vacuums emerge. In other words, it is possible that, due to the region’s volatile religious and political sectarianism, alongside ethnic and factional tensions, a situation similar to that seen in Iraq could emerge if a successful regime decapitation is carried out. Whether or not this will occur is another question entirely, although it cannot be ruled out.

IRANIAN STRATEGY

Noting its inadequacy in military technology and its limited role in domestic engineering and manufacturing, Iran’s military strategy relies on two crucial components. The first, as should be well established, is the development of drones and missiles. With no air force or navy equivalent to its likely adversaries, this focus on overwhelming kinetic force is useful both as a geopolitical bargaining tool and, in the case of a hot war, primarily as a means to strain an adversary’s resources, rather than as an offensive tool.

The second element is the use of proxy networks to hedge against regional adversaries. While highly politicised and controversial for obvious reasons, the reality is that most conflict in this part of the world is fought indirectly through proxy forces in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and so forth. In theory, this tactic offers decentralised retaliatory strike capabilities in the event of war, through the distribution of short-range drones and smaller missile systems to these proxies.

Together, Iran’s strategy offers direct deterrence against these non-state actors entrenched throughout the Middle East. Together with the missile and drone focus, Iran has what is described as ‘forward defence’ in a war. This approach also allows Iran to threaten area denial in the Strait of Hormuz – potentially crippling global oil supply – and to act as a serious bargaining chip in avoiding conflict.

A final point to consider is digital warfare. Although its full capabilities are unknown, Iran—similar to Israel—has focused on cyber-warfare and the integration of AI into these operations. This encompasses a wide range, from traditional cyber attacks on digital infrastructure to GPSGPS (Global Positioning System): A satellite-based navigation system that provides precise location, velocity, and timing information to military airc... More jamming and related tactics.

CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, when it comes to manpower, Iran remains a serious force if motivated to fight, with close to 850,000 military personnel and perhaps as many as 200,000 Revolutionary Guard members. This could pose a serious threat if effectively employed in a defensive posture.

However, when it comes to air power, Iran’s Air Force finds itself in an interesting position. Largely outdated, the fleet has been significantly degraded by trade restrictions. While Russia has long been reported to be privately purchasing Iranian drones through back channels, both Russia and China seem hesitant to publicly sell advanced equipment to the Iranian regime—likely a tactical move, given Iran’s perceived autonomy from both the east and the west.

Just as in the Iraq War, the technology gap between Iran and the US indicates that, while Iran’s air defence network remains capable of threatening incoming aircraft, drones, or missiles, it is only a matter of time before stealth aircraft neutralise the primary threats in this network. Once these radar threats are gone, aircraft flying at altitude can essentially strike with immunity.

Thus, Iran relies almost entirely on growing its missile arsenal, building small drone systems, and having a fallback plan for defence and manufacturing in the event of war.

Put simply, Iran’s military is large, and its primary strength in air power is its surface-launched missile and drone programme. The air force itself lacks modernised aircraft, while its air defence systems remain a mystery in terms of capabilities.

To their credit, Iran has rigorously built up its own domestic manufacturing capabilities. While we don’t know how good any of this tech is, it is evidence of extreme motivation to hedge against its rivals. Time will tell. And there is every indication that it won’t be long before all of Iran’s military is put to the test.